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ABSTRACT
Recent advances in media generation techniques have made it
easier for attackers to create forged images and videos. State-
of-the-art methods enable the real-time creation of a forged
version of a single video obtained from a social network. Al-
though numerous methods have been developed for detecting
forged images and videos, they are generally targeted at cer-
tain domains and quickly become obsolete as new kinds of
attacks appear. The method introduced in this paper uses a
capsule network to detect various kinds of spoofs, from replay
attacks using printed images or recorded videos to computer-
generated videos using deep convolutional neural networks.
It extends the application of capsule networks beyond their
original intention to the solving of inverse graphics problems.
Index Terms— computer-generated video, replay attack,
forgery detection, capsule network
1. INTRODUCTION
Forged images and videos can be used to bypass facial au-
thentication and to create fake news media. The quality of
manipulated images and videos has seen significant improve-
ment with the development of advanced network architectures
and the use of large amounts of training data. This has dra-
matically simplified the creation of facial forgeries. Nowa-
days, the only thing needed to create a forged facial image
is simply a short video of the target person [1, 2] or an ID
photo [3, 4]. The techniques developed by Chung et al. [4]
and Suwajanakorn et al. [5] can improve the ability of attack-
ers to learn the mapping between speech and lip motion, en-
abling the creation of fully synthesized audio-video data for
any person. In this age of social networks serving as major
sources of information, fake news with manipulated multime-
dia can quickly spread and have significant effects. The deep-
fake phenomenon [6] is a good example of this threat—any
person with a personal computer can create videos incorporat-
ing the facial image of any celebrity by using a human image
synthesis technique based on artificial intelligence.
Several countermeasures have been proposed to deal with
manipulated images and videos. However, most of them
are aimed at particular types of attacks. For example, lo-
cal binary pattern (LBP)-based methods [7, 8] are effective
against replay attacks in which the attacker places a printed
photo or displays a video on a screen in front of the cam-
era. However, the eyes-focused method designed to detect a
deepfake forgery [9] can fail with the replay attack when the
video displayed is of the actual target person. Other meth-
ods have more generalized ability; for instance, Fridrich and
Kodovsky’s method [10] can be applied for both steganal-
ysis and detecting facial reenactment videos. However, its
performance on secondary tasks is limited in comparison
with task-specific methods like that of Rossler et al. [11].
Moreover, while some methods can detect a single forged
image [11, 12, 13], others require video input [9].
This paper presents a method that uses a capsule net-
work to detect forged images and videos in a wide range
of forgery scenarios, including replay attack detection and
(both fully and partially) computer-generated image/video
detection. This is pioneering work in the use of capsule net-
works [14, 15, 16], which were originally designed for com-
puter vision problems, to solve digital forensics problems. A
comprehensive survey of state-of-the-art related work and in-
tensive comparisons using four major datasets demonstrated
the superior performance of the proposed method.
2. RELATEDWORK
In this section, we group forgery detection approaches into
replay attack detection and computer-generated image/video
detection on the basis of the features used and their target.
Note that some approaches are two-fold while others are ap-
plicable only to certain types of attacks. We also provide
some basic information about capsule networks and the dy-
namic routing algorithm that made this kind of network prac-
tical.
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2.1. Replay Attack Detection
Prior to the current deep learning era, LBP methods were the
primary defense against replay attacks [7, 8]. The method
introduced by Kim et al. [17], which is based on local pat-
terns of the diffusion speed (local speed patterns), achieves
higher accuracy than that of LBP-based methods. Now, with
the introduction of deep learning, the ability to detect replay
attacks has been greatly improved. The method of Yang et
al. [18] uses a support vector machine to classify features ex-
tracted by a pre-trained convolutional neural network (CNN).
That of Menotti et al. [19] uses a similar procedure but opti-
mizes the filters in an available high-performance CNN archi-
tecture. The method of Alotaibi and Mahmood [20] uses non-
linear diffusion based on an additive operator splitting scheme
in their own CNN. The recently introduced method of Ito et
al. [21] leverages a pre-trained CNN and utilizes the whole
image instead of only the extracted face region.
2.2. Computer-Generated Image/Video Detection
There are several state-of-the-art methods for detecting im-
ages or videos generated by computer using, for example,
a deepfake technique for face swapping [6], the Face2Face
method for facial reenactment [1], or the deep video por-
traits technique [2] for the purpose of forgery. Fridrich and
Kodovsky [10] proposed a hand-crafted-feature noise-based
approach for steganalysis that can also be used for forgery
detection. Cozzolino et al. [22] implemented a CNN version
of this approach. Raghavendra et al. [23] described the spe-
cial case of fine-tuning two available CNNs while Rossler et
al. [11] used only one CNN. Bayar and Stamm [24], Rah-
mouni et al. [25], Afchar et al. [13], Quan et al. [26], and Li
et al. [9] proposed their own networks. Li et al.’s network [9],
for example, is video based and uses temporal information to
detect eye blinking. We used a hybrid approach [12] incorpo-
rating part of a pre-trained VGG (Visual Geometry Group)-19
network [27] and a proposed CNN. Zhou et al. [28] proposed
a two-stream network.
2.3. Capsule Networks
Hinton et al. [14] addressed the limitations of CNNs applied
to inverse graphics tasks and laid the foundation for a more
robust “capsule” architecture in 2011. However, this com-
plex architecture could not be effectively implemented at the
time due to the lack of an efficient algorithm and the limita-
tions of computer hardware. Instead, easy-to-design easy-to-
train CNNs became widely used. Now, with the introduction
of the dynamic routing algorithm [15] and the expectation-
maximization routing algorithm [16], capsule networks have
been implemented with remarkable initial results. Two re-
cent studies demonstrated that, with the agreement between
capsules calculated by the dynamic routing algorithm, the hi-
erarchical pose relationships between object parts can be well
described. This has improved the accuracy of vision tasks.
Application of a capsule network to the forensics task, the
focus of this paper, is a challenging problem. However, the
agreement between capsules achieved by using the dynamic
routing algorithm could boost detection performance on com-
plex and nearly flawless forged images and videos.
3. CAPSULE-FORENSICS
3.1. Overview
VGG-19 CapsuleNetwork
Pre-
processing
Post-
processing
Fig. 1. Overview of proposed method.
The proposed method (Fig. 1) works for both images and
videos. For video input, the video is split into frames in
the pre-processing phase. The classification results (posterior
probabilities) are then acquired from the frames. The prob-
abilities are averaged in the post-processing phase to get the
final result. The remaining parts are identical to the input im-
age.
In the pre-processing phase, faces are detected and scaled
to 128× 128. Like we did in our previous work [12], we use
part of the VGG-19 network [27] to extract the latent features,
which are the inputs to the capsule network. Unlike we did in
our previous work, we take the output of the third maxpooling
layer instead of three outputs before the ReLU layers. We do
this because we need to reduce the size of the inputs to the
capsule network.
3.2. Capsule Design
Dynamic 
routing
Real image 
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Fake image 
capsule
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Fig. 2. Overall design of capsule-forensics network.
The proposed network consists of three primary capsules
and two output capsules, one for real and one for fake images
(Fig. 2). The latent features extracted by part of the VGG-19
network [27] are the inputs, which are distributed to the three
primary capsules (Fig. 3). As in our previous work [12], sta-
tistical pooling, which is important for forgery detection, is
used. The outputs of the three capsules (uj|i) are dynamically
ReLU
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batch normalization
statistical pooling
64
64 × 64
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64 × 64
2
16
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8
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8
Fig. 3. Detailed design of primary capsule. Upper numbers
indicate number of filters (depth) while lower number indicate
size of outputs of corresponding filters.
Algorithm 1 Dynamic routing between capsules.
procedure ROUTING(uj|i,W, r)
Wˆ ←W + rand(size(W ))
uˆj|i ← Wˆisquash(uj|i) . Wi ∈ Rm×n
for all input capsule i and all output capsules j do
bij ← 0
for r iterations do
for all input capsules i do ci ← softmax(bi)
for all output capsules j do sj ←
∑
i cij uˆj|i
for all output capsules j do vj ← squash(sj)
for all input capsules i and output capsules j do
bij ← bij + uˆj|i · vj
return vj
routed to the output capsules (vj) for r iterations using Algo-
rithm 1. The network has approximate 2.8 million parame-
ters, a relatively small number for such networks. We slightly
improved the algorithm of Sabour et al. [15] by adding Gaus-
sian random noise to the 3-D weight tensor W and applying
one additional squash (equation 1) before routing by iterat-
ing. The added noise helps reduce over-fitting while the ad-
ditional equation keeps the network more stable. The outputs
of the primary and output capsules are illustrated in Fig. 4.
vj = squash(sj) =
‖sj‖2
1 + ‖sj‖2
sj
‖sj‖ (1)
Unlike Sabour et al.’s work [15], we use the cross-entropy
loss function:
L = − (y log(yˆ) + (1− y) log(1− yˆ)) , (2)
where y is the ground truth label and yˆ is the predicted la-
bel calculated using equation 3, in which m is the number of
dimensions of the output capsule vj .
yˆ =
1
m
∑
i
softmax
([
vᵀ1
vᵀ2
]
:,i
)
(3)
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Fig. 4. Average results calculated by primary capsules and
output capsules from real and fake images generated with
Face2Face method [1]. Three primary capsules have signif-
icantly different reactions between real and fake inputs. Al-
though their weights are also different, there is strong agree-
ment in the output capsules.
The use of equation 3 instead of simply using the length
of the output capsules [15] promotes separation between the
two output capsules on each dimension.
4. EVALUATION
To evaluate the advantage of using random noise, we tested
the proposed method with and without using random noise
(Capsule-Forensics-Noise and Capsule-Forensics, respec-
tively). The random noise was generated from a normal
distribution N(0, 0.01) and was used in the training phase
only. Two iterations (r = 2) were used in the dynamic
routing algorithm. We used the half total error rate (HTER)(
FRR+FAR
2
)
and accuracy
(
TP+TN
TP+TN+FP+FN
)
as metrics.
4.1. Replay Attack Detection
To determine the ability of the proposed method to detect re-
play attacks, we compared its performance with that of eight
state-of-the-art detection methods on the well-known Idiap
REPLAY-ATTACK dataset [7]. As shown in Table 1, the pro-
posed method with random noise (Capsule-Forensics-Noise),
as well as our previous method [12], had an HTER of zero.
Table 1. Half total error rate of state-of-the-art detection
methods on REPLAY-ATTACK dataset [7].
Method HTER (%)
Chigovska et al. [7] 17.17
Pereira et al. [8] 08.51
Kim et al. [17] 12.50
Yang et al. [18] 02.30
Menotti et al. [19] 00.75
Alotabib et al. [20] 10.00
Ito et al. [21] 00.43
Nguyen et al. [12] 00.00
Capsule-Forensics 00.28
Capsule-Forensics-Noise 00.00
4.2. Face Swapping Detection
We determined the ability of our proposed method to detect
face swapping using a deepfake technique on the deepfake
dataset proposed by Afchar et al. [13] at both the frame and
video levels. As shown in Tables 2 and 3, our proposed
method with random noise (Capsule-Forensics-Noise) had
the highest accuracy in both cases.
Table 2. Accuracy of face swapping detection at frame level
on deepfake dataset [13].
Method Accuracy (%)
Meso-4 [13] 89.10
MesoInception-4 [13] 91.70
Nguyen et al. [12] 92.36
Capsule-Forensics 94.47
Capsule-Forensics-Noise 95.93
Table 3. Accuracy of face swapping detection at video level
on deepfake dataset [13].
Method Accuracy (%)
Meso-4 [13] 96.90
MesoInception-4 [13] 98.40
Capsule-Forensics 97.69
Capsule-Forensics-Noise 99.23
4.3. Facial Reenactment Detection
We determined the ability of our proposed method to detect
facial reenactment on the FaceForensics dataset [11], which
was created using the Face2Face method [1]. We strictly fol-
lowed the authors’ guidelines for processing the data. As
shown in Table 4, on average, the proposed method (with
and without noise) had performance comparable to that of the
best-performing state-of-the-art methods.
We also tested our method at the video level and compared
its performance with that of Afchar et al.’s MesoNet facial
video forgery detection network [13]. For our method, we
used only the first ten frames instead of the entire video. As
shown in Table 5, our method outperformed Afchar et al.’s
network.
4.4. Fully Computer-Generated Image Detection
Finally, we compared the performance of our proposed
method with that of state-of-the-art methods on computer-
generated images (CGIs) and photographic images (PIs) on
the dataset proposed by Rahmouni et al. [25]. Once again, as
shown in Table 6, our method had the best performance and
had perfect accuracy on full-size test images.
5. CONCLUSION
Our comprehensive experiments demonstrated the feasibility
of building a general detection method that is effective for
Table 4. Accuracy of state-of-the-art facial reenactment de-
tection methods at frame level on FaceForensics dataset [11]
with three levels of compression: no compression, easy com-
pression (23), and strong compression (40).
Method Accuracy (%)No-C Easy-C Hard-C
Fridrich & Kodovsky [10] 99.40 75.87 58.16
Cozzolino et al. [22] 99.60 79.80 55.77
Bayar & Stamm [24] 99.53 86.10 73.63
Rahmouni et al. [25] 98.60 88.50 61.50
Raghavendra et al. [23] 97.70 93.50 82.13
Zhou et al. [28] 99.93 96.00 86.83
Rossler et al. [11] 99.93 98.13 87.81
Meso-4 [13] 94.60 92.40 83.20
MesoInception-4 [13] 96.80 93.40 81.30
Nguyen et al. [12] 98.80 96.10 76.40
Capsule-Forensics 99.13 97.13 81.20
Capsule-Forensics-Noise 99.37 96.50 81.00
Table 5. Comparison with MesoNet network at video level
on FaceForensics dataset [11].
Accuracy (%)
No-C Easy-C Hard-C
Meso-4 [13] - 95.30 -
MesoInception-4 [13] - 95.30 -
Capsule-Forensics 99.33 98.00 82.00
Capsule-Forensics-Noise 99.33 96.00 83.33
Table 6. Accuracy of state-of-the-art methods on discriminat-
ing between CGIs and PIs.
Method AccuracyPatch Full Size
Rahmouni et al. [25] 89.76 99.30
Quan et al. [26] 94.75 99.58
Nguyen et al. [12] 96.55 99.86
Capsule-Forensics 96.75 99.72
Capsule-Forensics-Noise 97.00 100.00
a wide range of forged image and video attacks. They also
demonstrated that capsule networks can be used in domains
other than computer vision. The proposed use of random
noise in the training phase proved beneficial in most cases.
Future work will mainly focus on evaluating the ability of
the proposed method to resist adversarial machine attacks,
especially on the proposed random noise at test time, and en-
hancing its ability. It will also focus on making the proposed
method robust against mixed attacks and on raising this criti-
cal issue in the research community.
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